41433 - DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

Conoscenze e abilità da conseguire

The course analyzes the factors that constrain growth and development in Low Income Countries (LICs) whose economy is characterized by weak institutions, severe market imperfections such as imperfect labor markets, and lack of access to credit. The analysis will be conducted using standard methods of the economists’ toolkit, including economic modeling, game theory, and behavioral economics.  The course will extensively refer to empirical studies and field work to investigate the effectiveness of the policies designed to improve social welfare in developing countries. At the end of the course, students will be able to: 1) discuss and analyze theoretical models referring to market imperfections characterizing LICs; 2) understand the empirical methods that are used by the profession to study developing countries; 3) identify the connections between the theoretical literature and the outstanding empirical evidence.

Contenuti

The course will discuss key topics in Development Economics:

1) Foreign Aid

2) Credit Markets

3) Microfinance

4) Insurance Markets

5) Agricultural Markets

6) Savings

7) Education

8) Health

9) Historical Institutions

10) Corruption

11) Property Rights

Knowledge of microeconomics and econometric methods is extremely important.

Testi/Bibliografia

During the course several papers will be discussed. Advanced knowledge of econometric methods is crucial to understand the content of these papers.

Below you can find a preliminary (and incomplete) list of papers to be discussed:

Kuziemko I, Werker E. 2006. How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. J. of Poli. Econ. 114: 905-930

Werker E, Ahmed F Z, Cohen C. 2009. How Is Foreign Aid Spent Evidence from a Natural Experiment. Amer. Econ. J. Macro.1:225-44 Only pp225-237

Khwaja, Asim, and Atif Mian. (2005). Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4).

Field, Erica, Rohini Pande, John Papp and Natalia Rigol. 2013.”Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India.” American Economic Review, 103(6): 2196-2226.

Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia Kinnan. 2015. ”The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(1): 22-53.

Paxson, Christina H. ”Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in Thailand,” American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 15-33

Banerjee, Abhijit, Paul Gertler, and Maitreesh Ghatak, Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (2002), 239-280

Konrad B Burchardi Selim Gulesci Benedetta Lerva Munshi Sulaiman, 2019. ”Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence from Tenancy Contracts,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 134(1), pages 281-347.

Dupas, Pascaline, Dean Karlan, Jonathan Robinson, and Diego Ubfal. 2018. ”Banking the Unbanked? Evidence from Three Countries.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 10 (2): 257-97.

Nava Ashraf Dean Karlan Wesley Yin, 2006. ”Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence From a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(2), pages 635-672.

Kast, Felipe Meier, Stephan Pomeranz, Dina, 2018. ”Saving more in groups: Field experimental evidence from Chile,” Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C)

Duflo, Esther. 2001. ”Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment.” American Economic Review, 91(4): 795-813.

Robert Jensen, ”The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (2) (2010): 515-548.

Robert Jensen, ”Do Labor Market Opportunities Affect Young Women?s Work and Family Decisions? Experimental Evidence from India” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2012) 127(2): 753-792

Bjorkman.M and J.Svensson (2009) Power to the People: Evidence of a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda, Quarterly Journal of Economics 24:735-69.

Galiani.S, P.J.Gertler and E.Schargrodsky (2005) Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 113: 83-120.

Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer. (2005) History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. American Economic Review, 95 (4): 1190-1213.

Huillery, Elise. 2009. ”History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1 (2): 176-215

Besley, Timothy (1995). Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana, Journal of Political Economy, 103(5), 903-37. (only until pp931)

Field, Erica (2007), Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1561-1602.

Galiani, Sebastian, and Ernesto Schargrodsky (2010), Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling, Journal of Public Economics, 94(9-10)

Metodi didattici

Slides and Blackboard

Modalità di verifica e valutazione dell'apprendimento

Written examination and presentation.

The maximum possible score is 30 cum laude, in case all anwers are correct, complete and formally rigorous.

The grade is graduated as follows:

<18 failed
18-23 sufficient
24-27 good
28-30 very good
30 e lode excellent

Strumenti a supporto della didattica

PDF slides of the course distributed to students.

Orario di ricevimento

Consulta il sito web di Sara Lazzaroni