31807 - POLITICA COMPARATA (SEMINARIO)

Conoscenze e abilità da conseguire

Obiettivo del corso è fornire una introduzione ai metodi della politica comparata, guidando il loro apprendimento ai principali temi di ricerca aventi ad oggetto la competizione politica e i suoi riflessi sulle modalità di esercizio dei poteri di governo. Al termine del corso, lo studente acquisisce una capacità di analisi dei sistemi politici contemporanei tramite la conoscenza di teorie formali e studi empirici sulla formazione della fratture socio-politiche, la struttura dei sistemi partitici e l’influenza dei sistemi elettorali, la struttura dello spazio politico, le trasformazioni della struttura organizzativa e del ruolo dei partiti politici, la politica di coalizione e i processi di formazione delle maggioranze di governo.

Contenuti

Programma/Contenuti

1.                  I classici

2.                  Il metodo comparato

3.                  Le istituzioni politiche

4.                  Le forme di governo

5.                  Competizione politica e stabilità dei governi

6.                  Sistemi partitici e partiti politici

7.                  Le conseguenze politiche dei sistemi elettorali

8.                  Sistemi politici e redistribuzione del reddito

9.                  Politica comparata e politica internazionale I

10.              Politica comparata e politica internazionale II

Bibliografia

Il simbolo [IT] vuol dire che esiste anche una traduzione italiana, ma si consiglia di usare la versione originale in inglese. I saggi da leggere prima del seminario sono indicati con un asterisco, gli altri saggi sono consigliati per approfondire la conoscenza della materia.

1.      I classici : Weber e Durkheim

*Giddens, A. Capitalismo e teoria sociale, Marx, Durkheim e Weber, 1998.

*Weber, M. Economia e Società, Cap 2.

*Gerth, H. H. and C. Wright Mills. 1958. From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology, Routledge, Capp. I, IV, VII, e VIII.

*Durkheim, 1999 La divisione del lavoro sociale, Introduzione di A. Pizzorno, Milano Edizioni di Comunità.

2. Il metodo comparato

 Bates, R. H. 1997.  Comparative Politics and Rational Choice: A Review Essay. American political science review, vol. 91, no. 3,  699-704.

 

Brady, H. E. e D. Collier. 2004. Rethinking Social Inquiry. Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield Publ., capp.. 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13.

 

Collier, D. e J. E. Mahoney, Jr. 1993. Conceptual  Stretching  Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis., American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 4, 845-855.

 

Collier, D. e J. Mahoney. 1996.  Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research. World Politics, 49, 56-91.

 

*King,G.  Keohane, R e S. Verba, 1994, Designing Social Inquiry, Capp 1-3. Princeton University Press.

 

*Landman T. 2000, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction, London, Routledge, pp. 1-55.

 

Lieberson, S., 1992,“Small N's and Big Conclusions” in Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, eds., What is a Case? , NY: Cambridge University Press, 105-118.

 

*Lijphart, Arend. 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American Political Science Review, 65, no. 3, 682-693.

*Liphart, Arend. 1975. The Comparative-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research., Comparative Political Studies, 8, 158-177.

 

 Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Ragin, Charles C. Fuzzy-Set Social Science, Chicago : University of Chicago Press 2000, capp 1-5.

 

*Sartori, Giovanni. 1970.  Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, American Political Science Review, 64: 1033-53.

 

*Tsebelis, George. 1990. Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Capp 1-3.

.

3. Le  istituzioni politiche

 

 Firmin-Sellers, K.  1995. “The Politics of Property Rights,” American Political Science Review, 89, 4: 867-881.

*Giannetti, D. Teoria politica positiva. Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002, cap 2. *Kiewiet and McCubbins. 1991.  The Logic of Delegation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Cap.2

 North, D. 1990.  Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance,  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Capp. 4-8.

*North D. e B. Weingast, 1979, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” The Journal of Economic History, 49: 803-833. 

*Knight. J. 1995. “Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change,” in Knight and Sened, eds. Explaining Social Institutions,  pp. 95-120. 

 

 

4. Le forme di governo

 

Cox, G. and F.Rosenbluth, 1995,  “The Structural Determinants of Electoral Cohesiveness: England, Japan, and the United States,” in Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States.

*Lijphart, A.  1999, Patterns of Democracy, Yale University Press, (pp. 1-47). [IT 2001].

Moe,T. e Caldwell. 1994. “The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150/1. 

 

*Shugart, M.  e J.M. Carey.  1992.  Presidents and Assemblies.  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, capp. 12-13.[IT].

 

*Tsebelis George,1995. “Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism,” British Journal of Political Science, 25.

5. Competizione politica e stabilità dei governi

*Bartolini,S. 2002, Electoral and Party competition: Analytical Dimensions and Empirical Problems, in R. Gunther, R. Montero, J. Linz (eds), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges, Oxford University Press, pp. 84-110.

Laver, M. (1998), Models of government formation, in Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 1, pp. 1-25.

*Laver, M. (2003). Government Termination, in Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 6, pp. 23-40.

Lijphart A., 1999, Patterns of Democracy, Yale University Press, capp. 6-7 (pp. 90-142) [IT].

*Sartori, G. 1994, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, Macmillan, capp. 5, 6, 7 (pp. 83-140). [IT]

 *Shugart , M. e J.M. Carey , 1992, Presidents and Assemblies, Cambridge University Press, cap 3 (pp. 28-54). [IT]

6.  Sistemi partitici e partiti politici

A. La struttura dei sistemi partitici:

*Bardi, L. e P. Mair,  2008, Parameters of Party Systems, in  Party Politics, vol 14,  pp.147-166.

Gallagher, M. Laver, P. Mair (2001), Representative government in modern Europe, McGraw-Hill, cap. 7 (pp. 171-201).

 *Lijphart, A.  (1999), Patterns of Democracy, Yale University Press, cap. 5 (pp. 62-89), [IT].

B.La competizione nei partiti e la tesi della cartellizzazione

Gallagher, M. Laver, M. e P. Mair , 2001, Representative government in modern Europe, McGraw-Hill, cap. 10 (pp. 271-299).

* Katz,R. e  P. Mair , 1995, Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy, in Party Politics, n. 1, pp. 5-28.

 *Kitschelt, H. 2000, Citizens, politicians, and the party cartellization: Political representation and state failure in post-industrial democracies, in European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, pp. 149-179.

7. Le conseguenze politiche  dei sistemi elettorali

*Cox, G.W. 1997, Making Votes Counts, Cambridge University Press, capp. 2-3 (pp- 13-68). [IT]

*Cox ,G.W.1999, Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination, in Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 2: 145-61.

*Katz,R. 2005, Why are so many (or so few) electoral reforms?, in M. Gallagher e P. Mitchell (eds), The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford University Press, pp. 57-76.

*Lijphart, A. 1999, Patterns of Democracy, Yale University Press, pp. 143-170 (cap. 8). [IT]

 Shugart,M.S. 2005, Comparative Electoral Systems Research: The Maturation of a Field and New Challenger Ahead, in M. Gallagher e P. Mitchell (eds), The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford University Press, pp. 25-55.

  *Shugart, M.S. e M. Wattenberg (a cura di), Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of the Both Worlds?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, capp. 1-2 (pp. 9-51).

8. Sistemi politici e redistribuzione del reddito

Alesina, A. e  E.Glaeser, 2003, Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe. Oxford University Press, cap 4.

*Iversen, T., e D. Soskice, 2006 “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others,” American Political Science Review 100:2.

Persson, T. e G. Tabellini,  2003,The economic effects of constitutions, MIT Press, Cap 2 e  pp. 129-34;  140-44.

*Pontusson, J.2005, Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe Vs. Liberal America. Cornell University Press.

 

9. Politica comparata e politica internazionale I

*Caporaso, J. A. 1997, Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics, International Studies Quarterly, 41:4, pp. 563-92.

*Jacobsen, J. K., 1996, “Are All Politics Domestic? Perspectives on the Integration of

Comparative Politics and International Relations Theories,” Comparative Politics, 29, pp. 94-115.

 

10. Politica comparata e politica internazionale II

 

*Frieden, J., 1991, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a

World of Global Finance,” International Organization, 45, pp. 425-451.

Garrett, G., “Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous

Circle?” International Organization, 52, 1998, pp. 787-824.

Goldstein, J., 1996,“International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North

American ‘Unfair' Trade Laws,” International Organization ,50, pp. 541-

564.

Gourevitch, P, 1977,“International Trade, Domestic Coalitions and Liberty: Comparative

Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 8,

pp. 281-313.

*Gourevitch, P, 1978, “The Second Image Reversed,” International Organization, 32

 pp. 881-900.

*Katzenstein, P., 1985, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca,

NY: Cornell University Press, cap 1 (pp. 17-38) e 5 (pp. 191-211).

Mares, I., 2005,“Social Protection Around the World: External Insecurity, State Capacity,

and Domestic Political Cleavages,” Comparative Political Studies 38:6, pp. 623-

645.

Simmons, B., Dobbin, F. e G. Garrett, 2006,“Introduction: The International

Diffusion of Liberalism” International Organization 60, pp. 781-810.

 

Metodi didattici

Il corso si articola in venti seminari di due ore ciascuno. Sono previste brevi presentazioni da parte degli studenti basate sui saggi indicati nella reading list e su altre fonti frutto di una ricerca individuale. Tutti gli studenti frequentanti devono in ogni caso leggere in anticipo le letture obbligatorie e saranno invitati a intervenire sull'argomento oggetto del seminario. Ciascuno studente dovrà inoltre preparare un paper su uno dei temi del corso da discutere con il docente durante l'esame finale. La partecipazione al corso presuppone cognizioni di base di metodologia delle scienze sociali e nozioni fondamentali di scienza politica.

 

 

 

Testi/Bibliografia

1.      I classici : Weber e Durkheim

*Giddens, A. Capitalismo e teoria sociale, Marx, Durkheim e Weber, 1998.

*Weber, M. Economia e Società, Cap 2.

*Gerth, H. H. and C. Wright Mills. 1958. From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology, Routledge, Capp. I, IV, VII, e VIII.

*Durkheim, 1999 La divisione del lavoro sociale, Introduzione di A. Pizzorno, Milano Edizioni di Comunità.

2. Il metodo comparato

 Bates, R. H. 1997.  Comparative Politics and Rational Choice: A Review Essay. American political science review, vol. 91, no. 3,  699-704.

 

Brady, H. E. e D. Collier. 2004. Rethinking Social Inquiry. Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield Publ., capp.. 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13.

 

Collier, D. e J. E. Mahoney, Jr. 1993. Conceptual  Stretching  Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis., American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 4, 845-855.

 

Collier, D. e J. Mahoney. 1996.  Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research. World Politics, 49, 56-91.

 

*King,G.  Keohane, R e S. Verba, 1994, Designing Social Inquiry, Capp 1-3. Princeton University Press.

 

*Landman T. 2000, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction, London, Routledge, pp. 1-55.

 

Lieberson, S., 1992,“Small N's and Big Conclusions” in Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, eds., What is a Case? , NY: Cambridge University Press, 105-118.

 

*Lijphart, Arend. 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American Political Science Review, 65, no. 3, 682-693.

*Liphart, Arend. 1975. The Comparative-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research., Comparative Political Studies, 8, 158-177.

 

 Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Ragin, Charles C. Fuzzy-Set Social Science, Chicago : University of Chicago Press 2000, capp 1-5.

 

*Sartori, Giovanni. 1970.  Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, American Political Science Review, 64: 1033-53.

 

*Tsebelis, George. 1990. Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Capp 1-3.

.

3. Le  istituzioni politiche

 

 Firmin-Sellers, K.  1995. “The Politics of Property Rights,” American Political Science Review, 89, 4: 867-881.

*Giannetti, D. Teoria politica positiva. Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002, cap 2. *Kiewiet and McCubbins. 1991.  The Logic of Delegation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Cap.2

 North, D. 1990.  Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance,  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Capp. 4-8.

*North D. e B. Weingast, 1979, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” The Journal of Economic History, 49: 803-833. 

*Knight. J. 1995. “Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change,” in Knight and Sened, eds. Explaining Social Institutions,  pp. 95-120. 

 

 

4. Le forme di governo

 

Cox, G. and F.Rosenbluth, 1995,  “The Structural Determinants of Electoral Cohesiveness: England, Japan, and the United States,” in Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States.

*Lijphart, A.  1999, Patterns of Democracy, Yale University Press, (pp. 1-47). [IT 2001].

Moe,T. e Caldwell. 1994. “The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150/1. 

 

*Shugart, M.  e J.M. Carey.  1992.  Presidents and Assemblies.  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, capp. 12-13.[IT].

 

*Tsebelis George,1995. “Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism,” British Journal of Political Science, 25.

5. Competizione politica e stabilità dei governi

*Bartolini,S. 2002, Electoral and Party competition: Analytical Dimensions and Empirical Problems, in R. Gunther, R. Montero, J. Linz (eds), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges, Oxford University Press, pp. 84-110.

Laver, M. (1998), Models of government formation, in Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 1, pp. 1-25.

*Laver, M. (2003). Government Termination, in Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 6, pp. 23-40.

Lijphart A., 1999, Patterns of Democracy, Yale University Press, capp. 6-7 (pp. 90-142) [IT].

*Sartori, G. 1994, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, Macmillan, capp. 5, 6, 7 (pp. 83-140). [IT]

 *Shugart , M. e J.M. Carey , 1992, Presidents and Assemblies, Cambridge University Press, cap 3 (pp. 28-54). [IT]

6.  Sistemi partitici e partiti politici

A. La struttura dei sistemi partitici:

*Bardi, L. e P. Mair,  2008, Parameters of Party Systems, in  Party Politics, vol 14,  pp.147-166.

Gallagher, M. Laver, P. Mair (2001), Representative government in modern Europe, McGraw-Hill, cap. 7 (pp. 171-201).

 *Lijphart, A.  (1999), Patterns of Democracy, Yale University Press, cap. 5 (pp. 62-89), [IT].

B.La competizione nei partiti e la tesi della cartellizzazione

Gallagher, M. Laver, M. e P. Mair , 2001, Representative government in modern Europe, McGraw-Hill, cap. 10 (pp. 271-299).

* Katz,R. e  P. Mair , 1995, Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy, in Party Politics, n. 1, pp. 5-28.

 *Kitschelt, H. 2000, Citizens, politicians, and the party cartellization: Political representation and state failure in post-industrial democracies, in European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, pp. 149-179.

7. Le conseguenze politiche  dei sistemi elettorali

*Cox, G.W. 1997, Making Votes Counts, Cambridge University Press, capp. 2-3 (pp- 13-68). [IT]

*Cox ,G.W.1999, Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination, in Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 2: 145-61.

*Katz,R. 2005, Why are so many (or so few) electoral reforms?, in M. Gallagher e P. Mitchell (eds), The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford University Press, pp. 57-76.

*Lijphart, A. 1999, Patterns of Democracy, Yale University Press, pp. 143-170 (cap. 8). [IT]

 Shugart,M.S. 2005, Comparative Electoral Systems Research: The Maturation of a Field and New Challenger Ahead, in M. Gallagher e P. Mitchell (eds), The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford University Press, pp. 25-55.

  *Shugart, M.S. e M. Wattenberg (a cura di), Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of the Both Worlds?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, capp. 1-2 (pp. 9-51).

8. Sistemi politici e redistribuzione del reddito

Alesina, A. e  E.Glaeser, 2003, Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe. Oxford University Press, cap 4.

*Iversen, T., e D. Soskice, 2006 “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others,” American Political Science Review 100:2.

Persson, T. e G. Tabellini,  2003,The economic effects of constitutions, MIT Press, Cap 2 e  pp. 129-34;  140-44.

*Pontusson, J.2005, Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe Vs. Liberal America. Cornell University Press.

 

9. Politica comparata e politica internazionale I

*Caporaso, J. A. 1997, Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics, International Studies Quarterly, 41:4, pp. 563-92.

*Jacobsen, J. K., 1996, “Are All Politics Domestic? Perspectives on the Integration of

Comparative Politics and International Relations Theories,” Comparative Politics, 29, pp. 94-115.

 

10. Politica comparata e politica internazionale II

 

*Frieden, J., 1991, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a

World of Global Finance,” International Organization, 45, pp. 425-451.

Garrett, G., “Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous

Circle?” International Organization, 52, 1998, pp. 787-824.

Goldstein, J., 1996,“International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North

American ‘Unfair' Trade Laws,” International Organization ,50, pp. 541-

564.

Gourevitch, P, 1977,“International Trade, Domestic Coalitions and Liberty: Comparative

Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 8,

pp. 281-313.

*Gourevitch, P, 1978, “The Second Image Reversed,” International Organization, 32

 pp. 881-900.

*Katzenstein, P., 1985, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca,

NY: Cornell University Press, cap 1 (pp. 17-38) e 5 (pp. 191-211).

Mares, I., 2005,“Social Protection Around the World: External Insecurity, State Capacity,

and Domestic Political Cleavages,” Comparative Political Studies 38:6, pp. 623-

645.

Simmons, B., Dobbin, F. e G. Garrett, 2006,“Introduction: The International

Diffusion of Liberalism” International Organization 60, pp. 781-810.

 

Metodi didattici

Il corso si svolge con metodo seminariale. Gli studenti leggeranno attentamente i testi assegnati ogni settimana e in classe si analizzeranno e si discuteranno in modo critico i principali temi  e problemi trattati nella letteratura. Gli studenti presentaranno un paper su un argomento concordato con il docente.

Modalità di verifica e valutazione dell'apprendimento

IL CORSO E' DIRETTO A SOLI STUDENTI FREQUENTANTI

La frequenza al corso è obbligatoria e non è ammesso un numero di assenze superiori al 10% del numero delle lezioni

La valutazione di ogni singolo studente, in trentesimi,   è strutturata come segue:

- partecipazione alle discussioni con particolare riferimento alla qualità delle argomentazioni presentate ( max 10 punti);

- presentazione durante il corso di un paper  su un tema di politica comparata, di cui sarà valutato sia il contenuto che la capacità espositiva (max 10 punti);

- questionario a multiple choices  su temi e problemi della politica comparata (max 10 punti)

Strumenti a supporto della didattica

power point e proiettore

Orario di ricevimento

Consulta il sito web di Rosa Mulè