- Docente: Gianpaolo Rossini
- Crediti formativi: 8
- SSD: SECS-P/02
- Lingua di insegnamento: Inglese
- Moduli: Gianpaolo Rossini (Modulo 1) Manfred Holler (Modulo 2) Federico Trionfetti (Modulo 3)
- Modalità didattica: Convenzionale - Lezioni in presenza (Modulo 1) Convenzionale - Lezioni in presenza (Modulo 2) Convenzionale - Lezioni in presenza (Modulo 3)
- Campus: Forli
- Corso: Laurea Magistrale in Scienze internazionali e diplomatiche (cod. 8050)
Conoscenze e abilità da conseguire
Il fine del corso è fornire le conoscenze necessarie per esaminare in modo approfondito questioni di politica commerciale internazionale (sia dal punto di vista europeo che statunitense). Al termine del corso lo studente possiede familiarità con la letteratura economica e con le maggiori questioni di politica commerciale del WTO e con i modelli utilizzati nelleconomia internazionale.
Contenuti
Il corso è in due parti impartite rispettivanmente dai prof. Manfred Holler (Università di Amburgo) e Federico Trionfetti ( Université Aix Marseille II).
PART 1
Lecture: Theory of Voting and EU Decision Making
Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Manfred J. Holler,* Institute of SocioEconomics, University of Hamburg, and Public Choice Research Centre (PCRC), Turku.
20 hours - Monday, September 29, to Friday, October 11, 2008
A. Content and Syllabus (version June 11, 2008)
1. The meaning of voting
- expressing preferences (“expressive vote”)
- preference aggregation (“social welfare function”)
- selecting candidates, policies, outcomes.
2. Condorcet cycle and Arrow's impossibility theorem
2.1 The voting paradox
2.2 Arrow's impossibility theorem
2.3 Discussion of properties, conditions and axioms
3. Voting equilibria
3.1 Single-peaked preferences and the median voter model
3.2 The pie-slicing model
3.3 The Holler-Steunenberg model and EU decision making
4. Voting procedures when votes are sincere
4.1 New rules, new winners
4.2 Saari's challenge of the Condorcet winner
4.3 No-show paradox and non-monotonicity
4.4 Choice procedures and performance criteria
5. Voting games and sophisticate votes
5.1 Voting games
5.2 The McKelvey-Niemi proposition
5.3 The Gibbard-Sutterthwaite theorem
5.4 Manipulating the agenda vs. manipulating preferences
5.5 Manipulating the alternatives: The Hillinger paradox
6. Power in the European Union
6.1 Governmental institutions and elections
6.2 Power measures
6.3 European elections
6.4 Power and preferences
B. Mandatory reading:
Baldwin, Richard, and Mika Widgrén (2004), “Winners and losers under various dual majority rules for the EU's Council of Ministers,” in: M. Wiberg (ed.), Reasoned Choices, Essays in Honor of Academy Professor Hannu Nurmi on the occasion of his 60th birthday, Turku: Digipaino, 161-187.
Holler, Manfred J. and Stefan Napel (2007), “Democratic decision procedures, stability of outcome, and agent power, with special reference to the European Union,” in: J. C. Pardo and P. Schwartz (eds.), Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 220-234.
Holler, Manfred J. (1982), “Forming coalitions and measuring voting power”, Political Studies 30, 262-271.
Nurmi, Hannu (2006), Models of Political Economy, London and New York: Routledge, chapters 2, 7, 8, 10, and 11.
C. Additional reading:
Braham, Matthew and Manfred J. Holler (2005), “The impossibility of a preference-based power index”, Journal of Theoretical Politics 17, 2005, 137-157.
Felsenthal, Dan S. and Moshé Machover (2001), ‘The Treaty of Nice and Qualified
Majority Voting', Social Choice and Welfare 18, 431–64.
Holler, Manfred J. (1982), “Forming coalitions and measuring voting power”, Political Studies 30, 262-271.
Holler, Manfred J. (2008), “Exploiting the Prince”, in: M. Braham and F. Steffen (eds.), Power, Freedom, and Voting. Essays in Honour of Manfred J. Holler, Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 421-438.
Holler, Manfred J. and Johann Kellermann (1977), “Power in the European Parliament: What will change?” Quality and Quantity 11, 189-192.
Holler, Manfred J. and Hannu Nurmi (2005), “Power, outcomes and preferences”, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 225, 181-191.
Holler, Manfred J. and Peter Skott (2005), “The importance of setting the agenda”, Public Choice 125, 215-228.
Holler, Manfred J. and Stefan Napel (2007), “Democratic decision procedures, stability of outcome, and agent power, with special reference to the European Union”, in: J. C. Pardo and P. Schwartz (eds.), Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 220-234.
Holler, Manfred J. and Mika Widgrén (1999), “Why power indices for assessing European Union decision-making?”, Journal of Theoretical Politics 11, 321-330.
Merrill, Samuel III, and Bernard Grofman (1999), A Unified Theory of Voting. Directional and Proximity Spatial Models, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Napel, Stefan und Mika Widgrén (2006), “The Inter-instituional distribution of power in EU codecision,” Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming).
Nurmi, Hannu (1998), Rational Behaviour and the Design of Institutions: Concepts, Theories, and Models, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Nurmi, Hannu (1999), Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them, Berlin, Heidelberg, and New York: Springer.
Nurmi, Hannu (2008), “On the Relative Unimportance of Voting Weights:
Observations on Agenda-Based Voting Procedures,” unpublished.
Nurmi, Hannu, and Madeleine O. Hosli (2003), “Which Decision Rule for the
Future Council?” European Union Politics 4, 37-50.
Lagerspetz, Eerik (2004), “Evaluating voting systems”, in: M. Wiberg (ed.), Reasoned Choices, Essays in Honor of Academy Professor Hannu Nurmi on the occasion of his 60th birthday, Turku: Digipaino, 201-222.
Leininger, Wolfgang (1993), “The final vote: Berlin versus Bonn,” Finanzarchiv 50, 1-20.
Widgren, Mika (1994a), "Voting power in the EC and the Consequences of two different enlargements", European Economic Review 38, 1153-1170.
Widgren, Mika (1994b), "The relationship between voting power and policy impact in the European Union", Centre for Economic Policy Research, No. 1033.
Widgren, Mika (1995), "Probabilistic voting power in the EU Council: the cases of trade policy and social regulation", Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97, 345-356.
Widgren, Mika (2008), “The Impact of Council's Internal Decision-Making Rules on the Future EU,” Discussion paper, Public Choice Research Centre, Turku.
Wittman, Donald A. (1973), “Parties as utility maximizers”, American Political Science Review 67, 490-498.
*Institute of SocioEconomics, IAW, Universität Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, D-20146 Hamburg,
Fax: +49 40 428 38 6329, e-mail: holler@econ.uni-hamburg.de.
PART 2
COURSE OUTLINE
This is an advanced course in international trade focusing especially on economic integration. The course discusses the effect of economic integration on international specialization, on wages, on industrial agglomeration, on export performance of individual firms, and on economic welfare. The course introduces students to the models used for the analysis of these issues. The course requires students to have analytical skills and to be able to understand elementary empirical analysis.
REFERENCES
What follows is a long list of references. Naturally, the course will focus on a very small subset of the journal articles listed below (a total of five or six). The list may be useful however for students wishing to read additional material or wishing to begin a research in this area. Handouts will be distributed during the course and/or in the week preceding the beginning of the course.
BOOKS
Helpman H. and Krugman P. (1985) “Market Structure and Foreign Trade”, MIT Press.
Grossman, Gene M.; Rogoff, Kenneth, eds (1995) Handbooks in Economics, vol. 3. Amsterdam; New York and Oxford: Elsevier, North-Holland.
Bowen H.P, Hollander A., and Viaene J.M (1998) “Applied International Trade analysis”, Macmillan.
Fujita M. and J. Thisse (2002) “Economics of Agglomeration” Cambridge U.P.
Baldwin, Richard, Rikard Forslid, Philippe Martin, Gianmarco Ottaviano, and Frederic Robert-Nicoud (2003) “Economic Geography and Public Policy” Princeton University Press.
Feenstra, C. Robert (2004), “Advanced International Trade”, Princeton University Press.
JOURNAL ARTICLES
International Trade
1. Krugman Paul (1980). “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade”. American Economic Review 70, 950-959. 2. Head Keith, Thierry Mayer, and John Ries (2002) “On the Pervasiveness of the Home Market Effect” Economica 69: 371-90. 3. Davis, Donald and David Weinstein (1999). “Economic Geography and regional production structure: An empirical investigation” European Economic Review 43 (2): 379-407. 4. Davis, Donald and David Weinstein (2003). “Market Access, Economic Geography, and Comparative Advantage: An Empirical Assessment”, Journal of International Economics 59 (1): 1-23. 5. Head, Keith and John Ries (2001). “Increasing returns versus national product differentiation", American Economic Review 91 (4): 858-876.6. Davis Donald (1998). “The Home Market Effect: Trade and Industrial Structure." American Economic Review 88 (5), 1264-1276.
7. Amiti, Mary (1998) Inter-Industry trade in manufactures: Does country size matter? Journal of international Economics 44: 231-255.
8. Holmes, Thomas, J. and John, J. Stevens (2005) “Does home market size matter for the pattern of trade?” Journal of International Economics 65: 489-505.
9. Laussel, Didier and Thierry Paul (2007) “Trade and Location of Industries: some new results” Journal of International Economics 71:148-166
10. Zhihao Yu (2005) “Trade, market size, and industrial structure: revisiting the home-market effect” Canadian Journal of Economics 38 (1):255-272.
11. Crozet Matthieu and Federico Trionfetti “Trade costs and the home market effect” Journal of International Economics (forthcoming).
12. Trionfetti, Federico (2001). “Using Home–Biased Demand to Test Trade Theories” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 137 (3): 404-426. 13. Brülhart, Marius and Federico Trionfetti (2005). “A Test of Trade Theories When Expenditure is Home Biased”. CEPR WP n. 5097.
14. Behrens, Kristian; Lamorgese, Andrea; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. and Tabuchi, Takatoshi (2004) “Testing the ‘Home Market Effect' in a Multi-Country World: A Theory-Based Approach”. CEPR DP 4468.
15. Redding, Stephen and A.J. Venables (2004). “Economic Geography and International Inequality” Journal of International Economics 62:53-82.
16. Head, Keith and Thierry Mayer (2006) “ Regional Wage and Employment Responses to Market Potential in the E.U.” Regional Sciences and Urban Economics 36: 573-594.
17. Hanson, Gordon H. and Xiang, Chong (2004) “The Home Market Effect and Bilateral Trade Patterns”, American Economic Review, 94: 1108-1129.
18. Antweiler, Werner and Trefler, Daniel (2002) “Increasing Returns and All That: A View from Trade”. American Economic Review, 92: 93-119.
19. Leamer Edward E. (1980) “The Leontief Paradox, Reconsidered” Journal of Political Economy 88 (3):495-503. See also the corrigendum by J. Heravi (1986): JPE 94(5): 1120.
20. Trefler Daniel (1993) “International Factor Price Differences: Leontief was right!”, Journal of Political Economy 101:961-87. 21. Trefler Daniel (1995) “The case of missing trade and other mysteries” American Economic Review 85:1029-46. 22. Davis Donald and Davis Weinstein (2001) “An account of global factor trade” American Economic Review 91:1423-53.
23. Romalis, John. "Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade." American Economic Review, 2004, 94(1), pp. 67-97.
24. Davis, Donald and David Weinstein (2002) “Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The Geography of Economic Activity” American Economic Review 92(5): 1269-89.
25. Davis, Donald and David Weinstein (2004) “A Search for Multiple Equilibria in Urban Industrial Structure” NBER Working Paper Series, # 10252,
26. Head, Keith and Thierry Mayer (2004), “The Empirics of Agglomeration and Trade” in Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics, Volume 4, Eds J. V. Henderson, J-F Thisse (Amsterdam, North-Holland).
27. Schott Peter (2003) “One size fits all? Heckscher-Ohlin Specialization in Global Production” American Economic Review 93 (3):686-708
28. Schott Peter (2004) “Across-Product versus within-product specialization in International Trade” Quarterly Journal of Economics ():647-678.
29. Melitz Marc (2003) “The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity”, Econometrica 71 (6):1695-1725. 30. Bernard, Andrew, Stephen Redding and Peter K. Schott (2007) “Comparative advantage and heterogeneous firms” Review of Economic Studies 74: 31-66.
New Economic Geography
31. Krugman, Paul (1991). “Geography and Trade”, MIT Press, Cambridge MA. This is an introductory reading, easy to read and rich of insights.
32. Krugman, Paul (1991). “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography”. Journal of Political Economy 99, 483-499.
33. Krugman, Paul and Anthony J. Venables (1995). “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 857-880.
34. Neary, J. Peter (2001). “Of Hypes and Hyperbolas: Introducing the New Economic Geography” Journal of Economic Literature 34 (2): 536-561.
35. Martin, Philippe and Carol A. Rogers, (1995). “Industrial Location and Public Infrastructures”, Journal of International Economics 39 (3-4): 335-51.
36. Martin, Philippe, 1999, “Public Policies, Regional Inequalities and Growth”, Journal of Public Economics; 73 (1):85-105.
37. Puga, Díego and Anthony J. Venables (1997). “Preferential Trading Arrangements and Industrial Location” Journal of International Economics 43(3-4): 347-68.
38. Puga, Díego (1999) "The Rise and Fall of Regional Inequalities", European Economic Review 43 (2): 303-334.
39. Trionfetti, Federico, 2001, “Public Procurement, Market Integration, and Income Inequalities”, The Review of International Economics 9 (1): 29-41.
40. Brülhart, Marius and Federico Trionfetti, 2004. “Public Expenditure, International Specialisation and Agglomeration”, European Economic Review 48(4): 851-991.
41. Ludema, Rodney and Ian Wooton, 2000, “Economic Geography and the Fiscal Effects of Regional Integration” Journal of International Economics 52 (2): 331-57.
42. Haufler, Andreas and Ian Wooton, 1999, “Country Size and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment”, Journal of Public Economics 71 (1): 121-39.
43. Anderson F. and Forslid, Rikard (2003) “Tax Competition and Economic Geography” Journal of Public Economic Theory 5 (2): 279-304.
44. Kind Hans Jarle, Karen Helene Midelfart Knarvik, and Guttorm Schjelderup, 2000, “Competing for Capital in a 'Lumpy' World” Journal of Public Economics 78, (3): 253-74.
45. Ottaviano Gianmarco, Jacques Thisse (2002) “Integration, Agglomeration and the Political Economics of Factor Mobility” Journal of Public Economics 83(3): 429-456.
46. Ottaviano Gianmarco, T. Tabuchi, Jacques Thisse (2002), “Agglomeration and Trade Revisited”, International Economic Review 43(2): 409-435.
47. Baldwin, Richard and Paul Krugman, 2004, “Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonisation”, European Economic Review 48(1): 1-23.
48. Ottaviano Gianmarco and Tanguy van Ypersele (2005) “ Market Size and Tax Competition”, Journal of International Economics, 67 (1) 25-46.
49. Crozet,-Matthieu; Koenig-Soubeyran,-Pamina (2004) “EU Enlargement and the Internal Geography of Countries” Journal-of-Comparative-Economics 32(2): 265-79.
50. Baldwin Richard and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud (2000) “Free Trade Liberalization without Delocation” Canadian Journal of Economics 33 (3): 766-86 .
51. Charlot Sylvie, Carl Gaigné, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, and Jacques-François Thisse (2005) “Agglomeration and welfare: The core-periphery model in the light of Bentham, Kaldor, and Rawls” Journal of Public Economics.
Testi/Bibliografia
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Metodi didattici
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Modalità di verifica e valutazione dell'apprendimento
In due fasi alla fine di ciascun modulo.
I due docenti lo comunicheranno in aula.
Non sono previsti appelli successivi, ma solo un unico alla fine di ciascun modulo.
Strumenti a supporto della didattica
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Orario di ricevimento
Consulta il sito web di Gianpaolo Rossini
Consulta il sito web di Manfred Holler
Consulta il sito web di Federico Trionfetti