90296 - INFORMATION ECONOMICS

Scheda insegnamento

SDGs

L'insegnamento contribuisce al perseguimento degli Obiettivi di Sviluppo Sostenibile dell'Agenda 2030 dell'ONU.

Lavoro dignitoso e crescita economica Imprese innovazione e infrastrutture

Anno Accademico 2020/2021

Conoscenze e abilità da conseguire

At the end of the class, the student has a working knowledge of the basic tools and results derived in Information Economics. Specifically, the student is able to analyze: - adverse selection in markets and its possible remedies - adverse selection and moral-hazard in the Principal-Agent model

Contenuti

This is a course in Contract theory providing both introductory and advanced material about incentives with asymmetric information. The course will cover both hidden information problem (adverse selection) and hidden actions problems (moral hazard). The perspective is that of optimal contract design in presence of conflicting interests between parties (the contract designer, i.e. the principal, and the delegated agent).

  1. Introduction to the economics of information.
  2. Markets under adverse selection (the market for lemons).
  3. Signaling and screening.
  4. The theory of optimal risk-sharing.
  5. The principal-agent problem. Contracts under moral hazard.
  6. Adverse selection in the principal-agent model and the Revelation Principle.
  7. Multiple dimensions of adverse selection in markets and in the principal-agent model.
  8. Competition between principals in agency models with adverse selection: random participation versus bidimensional screening.

Testi/Bibliografia

- The market for lemons, signaling and screening: A.Mas-Colell, M.Whinston and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995, chap 13.
- Optimal risk-sharing and moral hazard: Milgrom-Roberts, Economics Organization and Management, McGraw Hill, 1992, chaps.5 and 7.
- The Revelation Principle: Laffont, J.J. and D. Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press, 2001, chap 2.
- Adverse selection and moral-hazard in contracts theory: Bolton P. and M. Dewatripont, Contract Theory, The MIT Press, 2005, chaps 2 (sections 2.1 and 2.3.3) and 4 (sections 4.1 and 4.2).

Materiale didattico preparato dal docente.

Metodi didattici

Lezioni frontali e presentazioni degli studenti.

Modalità di verifica dell'apprendimento

Presentazione di un articolo scientifico davanti alla classe.

Strumenti a supporto della didattica

Materiale fornito dal docente

Link ad altre eventuali informazioni

https://sites.google.com/site/francescabarigozziunibo/teaching/microeconomics-3

Orario di ricevimento

Consulta il sito web di Francesca Barigozzi