78012 - Mind and Language (1)

Learning outcomes

This course will introduce to some central topics and arguments in the philosophy of mind and language in the tradition of analytic philosophy. The main aim is to engage in detail with some arguments and texts that have played a central role in contemporary discussions. Possible topics include: the nature of linguistic and mental content, the nature of thought and its relation to linguistic understanding; what is reference and meaning and what are their relations to intentionality and concepts; the relation between our inferential and representiational abilities and the nature of our rationality; the nature and our knowledge of our mental states; the relation between the physical and the mental domains. Students will acquire an understanding of some central topics in the philosophy of mind and language and they will be in a position to explain and to engage competently orally and in writing with these problems. More specifically they will be in a position to: * master the central concepts in the theory of language and mind; * understand the philosophical positions involved on the debates; * understand the arguments in favour or against the relevant philosophical theses; * have some appreciation of the significance of these issues for other areas of philosophy.

Course contents

This course surveys some central topics in the metaphysics and epistemology of logic including the concept of logical consequence, the concept of truth, the debates on logical pluralism and logical monism, logical realism/anti-realism, logical normativity, and logical anti-exceptionalism. Although this course does not presuppose any specific competence in formal logic, some basic acquaintance in elementary formal logic may help.

 

*Provisional* Programme:

Lecture 1 — Introduction to the course

Lectures 2 & 3 — Truth & Logic

Compulsory Reading: Read (1994), Chapter 1: pp. 5-31

Secondary Reading: Tarski, A. (1944).

Lectures 4 & 5 — Logical Consequence

Compulsory Reading: Tarski (1956).

Secondary Readings: Beall, Restall, and Sagi (2019); Sher (2022), Chapter 2.

Lectures 6, 7, 8, 9 — Topics in the Metaphysics of Logic

• Realism vs. Anti-Realism
• Monism vs. Pluralism 

Compulsory Readings: Cohnitz & Estrada-Gonzales (2019), Chapter 5 pp. 113-135; Beall & Restall (2006), Chapter 3

Secondary Readings: McSweeney (2018); Griffiths & Paseau (2022), chapters 1-3; Russell (2018); Shapiro (2014), chapters 1 & 2; Warren (2020), chapters 1 & 4; Wright (2018)

Lectures 10, 11, 12, 13 — Topics in the Epistemology of Logic

•  Logical apriorism and the justification of logic
•  Logical normativity

Compulsory Reading: Cohnitz & Estrada-Gonzales (2019), Chapter 6: pp. 136-161; Ferrari & Hlobil (ms).

Secondary Readings: Boghossian (2000); Bueno (2010); Field (1996); Leech (2015); McGee (1985); Priest (2016); Russell (2017); Steinberger (2017)

Lectures 14 & 15 — Logical Anti-Exceptionalism

Compulsory Reading: Martin & Hjortland (2020)

Secondary Readings: da Costa & Arenhart (2018); Priest (2014); Read (2019); Rossberg & Shapiro (2021); Williamson (2014).

Readings/Bibliography

Compulsory Readings

The list of compulsory readings is specified in the syllabus. 

Primary textbook

• Cohnitz, D. & Estrada-González, L. (2019) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  

Volumes and Handbooks on Philosophy of Logic

• Haack, S. (1978) Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Read, S. (1995) Thinking about Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Sainsbury, M. (1991) Logical Forms: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, Oxford: Blackwell.
• Shapiro, S. (ed.) (2007) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further Readings

• Azzouni, J. (2014) “A Defense of Logical Conventionalism”, in Rush (2014): pp. 32-48.
• Barnard, R., Ulatowski, J., & Weinberg, J. (2017) “Thinking about the Liar, Fast and Slow”, in B. Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39-70.
• Beall, JC & Restall, G. (2006) Logical Pluralism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Beall, Jc, G. Restall, and G. Sagi (2019) "Logical Consequence", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/logical-consequence/>.
• Boghossian, P. (2000) “Knowledge of Logic”, in Boghossian & Peacocke (eds.) New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford: Oxford University Press: pp.229-254.
• Bueno, O. (2010) “Is Logic A Priori?”, The Harvard Review of Philosophy 17: 105-117.
• Chihara, C. (2005) “Nominalism”, in Shapiro (2005): pp.483-514.
• Cook, R. (2005) “Intuitionism Reconsidered”, in Shapiro (2005): pp. 387-411.
• Cook, R. (2010) “Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of Logical Pluralism”, Philosophy Compass, 5(6): 492-504.
• da Costa, N. & Arenhart, J. (2018) “Full-Blooded Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic”, Australasian Journal of Logic 15: 362–380.
• Eklund, M. (ms) “Logical Pluralism and Logical Monism”, forthcoming in: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Ferrari, F. et al (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Etchemendy, J. (1990) The Concept of Logical Consequence, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Etchemendy, J. (2008) “Reflections on Consequence.” In: New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy, Patterson, D. (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 263–299
• Feferman, S. (2014) “Logic, Mathematics, and Conceptual Structuralism”, in Rush (2014): pp. 72-92.
• Ferrari, F. & Hlobil, U. (ms) “Logical Normativity”, forthcoming in: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Ferrari, F. et al (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Ferrari, F. & Moruzzi, S. (2020) "Logical Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Normativity of Logic", Inquiry, 63 (3-4): 323–346 (DOI:10.1080/0020174X.2017.1393198).
• Ferrari, F. & Orlandelli, E. (2019) “Proof-Theoretic Pluralism”, Synthese.
• Field, H. (1996) “The A Prioricity of Logic”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96: 359-379.
• Field, H. (1998) “Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic”, Philosophical Studies, 92: 1-24.
• Field, H. (2009) “What is the Normative Role of Logic?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83: 251-268.
• Hjortland, O. (2017) “Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic”, Philosophical Studies 174: 631–658.
• Griffiths, O. & Paseau, A.C. (2022) One True Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hodges, W. (2018) “Tarski’s Truth Definitions” (SEP)
• Incurvati, L. (ms) “Logical Expressivism”, forthcoming in: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Ferrari, F. et al (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Leech, J. (2015) “Logic and the Laws of Thought”, Philosophers’ Imprint 15: 1–27.
• MacFarlane, J. (2021) Philosophical Logic, New York: Routledge.
• Maddy, P. (2014) “A Second Philosophy of Logic”, in Rush (2014): pp. 93-108.
• Maddy, P. (ms) “Logical Naturalism”, forthcoming in: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Ferrari, F. et al (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Mancosu, P. Galvan, S., and Zach, R. (2021) An Introduction to Proof Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Martin, B. (2021) Introduction to Philosophy: Logic, Online publication: Rebus Community, https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-logic/
• Martin, B. & Hjortland, O. (2020) "Logical Predictivism", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 50: 285–318.
• McGee, V. (1985) “A Counterexample to Modus Ponens”, The Journal of Philosophy, 82(9): 462-471.
• McSweeney, M. (2018) “Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic”
• Moruzzi, S. and Pedersen, NJLL (ms) “Truth and Logic”, forthcoming in: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Ferrari, F. et al (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Priest, G. (2006) Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Priest, G. (2008) An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Cmabridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Priest, G. (2014) “Revising Logic”, in Rush (2014): pp. 211–223.
• Priest, G. (2016) “Logical Disputes and the A Priori”, Logique et Analyse 59: 347-366.
• Quine, W. V. (1986) Philosophy of Logic (2nd edition), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Ray, G. (2019) “Tarski on the Concept of Truth”, in Glanzberg, M. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.695–717.
• Read, S. (2019) "Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic", The Australasian Journal of Logic, 16 (7): 298–318.
• Restall, G. (ms) “The Philosophical Significance of Paradoxes”, forthcoming in: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Ferrari, F. et al (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Restall, G. and Russell, G. (2012) New Waves in Philosophical Logic, New York: Palgrave McMillan.
• Rossberg, M. (ms) “Logical Inferentialism”, forthcoming in: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Ferrari, F. et al (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rossberg, M. & Shapiro, S. (2021) "Logic and science: science and logic", Synthese 199 (3-4): 6429-6454.
• Rush, P. (2014) The Metaphysics of Logic, (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Russell, G. (2015) “The Justification of the Basic Laws of Logic”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6): 793-803.
• Russell, G. (2017) “Logic isn’t Normative”, Inquiry DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1372305.
• Russell, G. (2018) "Logical Nihilism: Could There be no Logic?", Philosophical Issues 28: https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12127.
• Russell, G. (2019) “Logical Pluralism” (SEP).
• Sainsbury, M. (2009) Paradoxes (3rd Edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Shapiro, S. (2014) Varieties of Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Shapiro, S. & Kouri Kissel, T. (2022) Classical First-Order Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Sher, G. (2016) Epistemic Friction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Sher, G. (2022) Logical Consequence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Steinberger, F. (2017) “The Normative Status of Logic” (SEP).
• Tahko, T. (2019) “A Survey of Logical Realism”, Synthese, doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02369-5
• Tarski, A. (1944) “The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4(3): 341-376
• Tarski, A. (1956) “On the Concept of Logical Consequence”, in Woodger, J.H. (ed.) Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938 by Alfred Tarski, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.409-420.
• Tahko, T. (2019) “A Survey of Logical Realism”.
• Tahko, T. (ms) “Logical Realism”, forthcoming in: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Ferrari, F. et al (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Warren, J. (2020) The Shadows of Syntax, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Warren, J. (ms) “Logical Conventionalism”, forthcoming in: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Ferrari, F. et al (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Williamson, T. (2014) “Logic, Metalogic, and Neutrality”, Erkenntnis 79: 211–231.
• Williamson, T. (2017) “Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology”, in B. Armour-Garb
• (ed.), Reflections on the Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 325–346.
• Wright, C. (2018) “Logical Non-Cognitivism”, Philosophical Issues, doi: 10.1111/phis.12132.
• Wright, C. (2021) “Making Exceptions”, Philosophical Topics, 49(2): 333–345, https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202149228
• Wyatt, J., Pedersen, NJLL, and Kellen, N. (2018) Pluralisms in Truth and Logic, New York: Palgrave McMillan.

Assessment methods

For those who will attend the course, the overall assessment consists in the following three parts:

1. An in-class assessment by means of short questionaries aimed at checking whether and to what extent the students have done (and understood) the preparatory readings (weight: 20% of the total mark).

2. A brief essay (between 2500 and 3500 words) in which the student critically discusses one of the topics dealt with during the course (weight: 60% of the total mark).

3. A short oral exam aimed at discussing the essay as well as the student's knowledge and understanding of some basic concepts dealt with during the course (weight: 20% of the total mark).

For those who will not attend the course, the overall assessment consists in the following two parts:

1. A written essay (between 4000 and 5000 words) in which the student critically discusses one of the topics dealt with during the course (weight: 60% of the total mark).

2. A (longer) oral exam aimed at discussing the essay as well as the student's knowledge and understanding of some basic concepts dealt with during the course (weight: 40% of the total mark).

In order to be regarded as attending the course the student has to take part in at least 60% of the classes (i.e. 9 lectures out of 15). The attendance will be ascertained by means of the replies to in-class questionnaires (which will be part of the overall assessment, as specified above).

Evaluation criteria

Concerning the in-class assessment, the evaluation will be based on the following criteria: (i) assessment of whether the student has done the preparatory reading; (ii) assessment of the extent to which the student has understood the main concepts of the pre-assigned reading.

Concerning the essay, the basic criteria for the evaluation are: (i) whether and to what extent the essay shows an adequate knowledge and understanding of the main topics and arguments dealt with in the essay; (ii) whether the essay is adequately structured (as indicated by the guidelines made available during the course); (iii) clarity of exposition and argumentative rigor. Further criteria which, if present, may increase the evaluation are: (iv) some originality in either the content or the argumentative structure; (v) ability to critically assess in an autonomous manner the contents and arguments dealt with in the essay; (vi) ability to connect profitably the topic dealt with in the essay with some of the other topics discussed during the course; (vii) whether the student is able to autonomously perform bibliographical and thematic searches on the topic of the essay.

Concerning the oral part of the exam, the criteria for the evaluation are: (i) the extent to which the student knows and understands in a critical manner the topic of the essay, also in relation to the broader context of the course; (ii) the extent to which the student knows and understands the main topics discussed during the course—other than those discussed in the essay (this will weigh more for those students who didn’t attend the course).

 

Assessment Grid

 

30 (cum laude) — Excellent overall performance which demonstrates a solid knowledge as well as a deep and critical understanding of the topics dealt with during the course

30 — Very good overall performance which demonstrates solid knowledge and a very good understanding of the topics dealt with during the course

29-27 — Good overall performance which demonstrates a good knowledge and understanding of the topics dealt with during the course

26-24 — Fair overall performance which demonstrates adequate knowledge and understanding, but with detectable lacunae, of the topics dealt with during the course

23-20 – Sufficient overall performance which demonstrates barely adequate knowledge and understanding, with important lacunae, of the topics dealt with during the course

19-18 — Barely sufficient overall performance which demonstrates a rather superficial knowledge and understanding of the topics dealt with during the course

17 or less – Insufficient overall performance which demonstrates significant failures of understanding as well as absence of knowledge of significant parts of the topics dealt with during the course. Exam failed.

Teaching tools

Handouts, Slides, Virtuale, Wooclap

Office hours

See the website of Filippo Ferrari