- Docente: Francesco Parisi
- Credits: 8
- SSD: SECS-P/03
- Language: Italian
- Teaching Mode: Traditional lectures
- Campus: Bologna
-
Corso:
Second cycle degree programme (LM) in
Financial Markets and Institutions (cod. 0901)
Also valid for Second cycle degree programme (LM) in Law and Economics (cod. 0899)
Learning outcomes
In this course a law and economics analysis of contract law is provided. Particularly, contract rules solving problems of uncertainty, risk aversion and uncertainty are analyzed, together with remedies for contract breach. The effect of several contractual clauses is also studied, in the attempt to design contractual solutions that have the effect to limit the opportunistic behavior of the parties.
Course contents
LectureI
The basis of the economic approach to the analysis of law.
Readings:
Parisi, “Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics” European Journal of Law and Economics (2004) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=586641 )
LectureII
Contracts without law?
Readings:
Kronman, Contract Law in the Law of Nature (Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1985)
Fon, V. e F. Parisi, “Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2003) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=313180 )
LectureIII
The Coase Theorem
Readings:
Parisi, “Coase Theorem,” in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed. (2010) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=981282 )
LectureIV
The economic functions of contract law
Readings:
Cooter-Ulen, Law and Economics (English edition), Cap. 6
LectureV
An economic model for remedies for breach of contract
Readings:
Cooter-Ulen, Law and Economics (English edition), Cap. 7
Cenini, M. e F. Parisi, “Interesse Positivo, Interesse Negativo e Incentivi nella Responsabilita' Contrattuale: Un'Analisi Economica e Comparata” 54 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE 218-242 (2008)
Parisi, F., B. Luppi e V. Fon, Optimal Remedies for Bilateral Contracts (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020669)
Lecture VI
The optimal allocation of risk in contracts
Readings:
Cenini, M. e F. Parisi, “Allocazione del Rischio tra Clausola Penale e Autonomia Contrattuale” 55 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE 309-325 (2009)
Lecture VII
Contract and Asymmetric Information
Readings:
Akerlof, George A. (1970). "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". Quarterly Journal of Economics (The MIT Press) 84 (3): 488–500
Dari-Mattiacci, Onderstal and Parisi, Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems (2010) (http://papers.ssrn.com/author=227722)
Parisi, Francesco “The Harmonization of Warranties in European Sales Law: An Economic Analysis”American Journal of Comparative Law(2004) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=276993)
Assessment methods
Written exam
Office hours
See the website of Francesco Parisi