Foto del docente

Marco Casari


Department of Economics

Academic discipline: SECS-P/02 Economic Policy


Keywords: Microeconomics Experimental Economics Environmental Economics Law and Economics

My current research interests span cross three areas:

|"""""" LOCAL AND GLOBAL COMMONS """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""|

Inspired by Elinor Ostrom, I studied a century-old case of local self-governance of the commons in the Alps through the lenses of Economic theory. Why did communities adopt a formal management regime instead of relying on Folk-theorem-type of informal cooperation? Why did the inheritance of the commons evolved toward a patrilineal system? What is the size of groups that succeded in cooperating? (website)
More recently, I have studied Climate Change through experimental methods and more specifically the possible behavioral obstacles to reach a cooperative outcome. Climate change has peculiar features, for instance damages are highly random and pollution is long-persistent.

-----------> Some related publications:

  • Group size in social-ecological systems, (with C.Tagliapietra), mimeo, University of Bologna
  • Gender Discrimination in Property Rights: Six Centuries of Commons Governance in the Alps (with M. Lisciandra), Journal of Economic History. 2016, 76, 2, 559-594.
  • Emergence of Endogenous Legal Institutions: Property Rights and Community Governance in the Italian Alps, Journal of Economic History, 2007, 67, 1, 191-226.
  • Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution, (with C.R. Plott) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2003, 51, 2, 217-247.
  • Climate Change: Behavioral Responses from Extreme Events and Delayed Damages. (with R. Ghidoni and G. Calzolari), Forthcoming, Energy Economics.
  • Carbon is Forever: A Climate Change Experiment on Cooperation, (with G.Calzolari and R.Ghidoni), 2016, Working Paper DSE 1065, University of Bologna, R&R



|"""""" COOPERATION AMONG STRANGERS """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""|

Many societal challenges require an ability to cooperate to overcome social dilemma situations. I focus on set-ups where individuals are strangers to each other, which is the most difficult case and study institutions that can promote cooperative outcomes. Monetary exchange is one such institutions that helps individuals to coordinate and create surplus in society. In a controlled laboratory environment, does a convention of monetary exchange emerge and how does it affect economies when we vary their size, money supply, or the availability of other record-keeping institutions?


-----------> Some related publications:

  • Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time, (with M. Bigoni, A. Skrzypacz, G.Spagnolo) Econometrica, 2015, 83, 587-616.
  • The coordination value of monetary exchange: Experimental evidence, (with G. Camera), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014, 6 (1), 290-314.
  • Money and Trust among Strangers, (with G. Camera and M. Bigoni), Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 2013, 110, 37, 14889-14893.
  • Pro-sociality and strategic reasoning in economic decisions, (with B. Arruñada, F. Pancotto) Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 2015, 9, 1-7
  • Money and the Scale of Cooperation, (with M.Bigoni, G.Camera), 2015, Working Papers 15-28, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  • Money is more than memory, (with M.Bigoni and G. Camera), 2015, CFS Working Paper Series 496, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  • Fragile Markets: An Experiment on Judicial Independence, (with B. Arruñada), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2016, 129, 142-56.
  • Experimental Markets with Frictions, (with Maria Bigoni and Gabriele Camera), Journal of Economic Surveys, 2013, 27, 3, 536-553.
  • Cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future, (with G. Camera) American Economic Review, 2009, 99, 3, 979–1005.
  • Group cooperation under alternative peer punishment technologies: an experiment, (with L. Luini) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2009, 71, 2, 273-282.
  • On the design of peer punishment experiments, Experimental Economics, 2005, 8, 2, 107-115.




Different economic performances across States may originate from differences in institutions, incentives, or resource endowments but also from preferences, norms and beliefs. I focus on the latter issues to study the Questione Meridionale in Italy, which is a paradigm of simingly intractable within country differences. Are people in the South systematically different in terms of risk preferences, pro-sociality, or ability to cooperate from people in the North? Another interest is also the integration of migrants into western societies and their in-group and out-group dispositions.


Video on the North-South divide project

-----------> Some related publications:

  • Amoral Familism, Social Capital, or Trust? The Behavioral Foundations of the Italian North-South Divide, (with M. Bigoni, S. Bortolotti, D. Gambetta, F. Pancotto), Economic Journal. 2016, 126, 594, 1318–1341.
  • At the root of the North-South cooperation gap in Italy: Preferences or beliefs?, (with M. Bigoni, S.Bortolotti, D.Gambetta), 2017, Working Paper DSE 1092, University of Bologna
  • Cooperation and Identity in a Multiethnic Society (with S. Bortolotti and C.Monti), in progress
  • It takes two to cheat: an experiment on derived trust, (with M. Bigoni, S. Bortolotti, D. Gambetta), European Economic Review, 2013, 1, 64, 129–146.
  • Norms of Punishment: Experiments with Students and the General Population, (with S. Bortolotti, F. Pancotto) Economic Inquiry. 2015, 53, 1207-1223