vai alle Pubblicazioni
Publications prior to 2004
·
Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time, (with M. Bigoni,
A. Skrzypacz, and G. Spagnolo) December 2011, Forthcoming,
Econometrica
.
·
Amoral Familism, Social Capital, or Trust? The Behavioral
Foundations of the Italian North-South Divide., (with M. Bigoni, S.
Bortolotti, D. Gambetta, F. Pancotto), conditionally accepted
in
Economic Journal
·
Choice Reversal without Temptation: A Dynamic Experiment on Time
Preferences (with D. Dragone), forthcoming in
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
·
Norms of Punishment: Experiments with Students and the General
Population, (with S. Bortolotti, F. Pancotto), Forthcoming,
Economic Inquiry.
·
The coordination value of monetary exchange: Experimental evidence,
(with G. Camera),
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
, 2014, 6 (1), 290-314.
·
Money and Trust among Strangers, (with G. Camera and M.
Bigoni),
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science
, 2013, 110, 37, 14889-14893.
·
It takes two to cheat: an experiment on derived trust, (with M.
Bigoni, S. Bortolotti, D. Gambetta),
European Economic Review
, 2013, 1, 64, 129–146.
·
Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and
clerical workers, (with Maria Bigoni and Gabriele Camera),
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
,
2013, 94, 172–182.
·
Experimental Markets with Frictions, (with Maria Bigoni and
Gabriele Camera),
Journal of Economic Surveys
, 2013, 27, 3, 536-553.
·
Explicit versus Implicit Contracts for Dividing the Benefits of
Cooperation, (with Timothy Cason),
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, 85, 2013, 20-34.
·
Binding promises and cooperation among strangers, (with Gabriele
Camera and Maria Bigoni),
Economics Letters
, 118, 3, 2013, 459–461.
·
Cooperative Strategies in Groups of Strangers: An Experiment, (with
G. Camera and M. Bigoni),
Games and Economic Behavior
,
2012, 75, 2, 570–586
·
Peer punishment in teams: expressive or instrumental choice?, (with
L. Luini),
Experimental Economics
,
2012, 15, 2, 241-259.
·
How groups reach agreement in risky choices: an experiment, (with
J. Zhang)
, Economic
Inquiry,
2012, 50, 2, 502–515
.
·
Weak reciprocity alone cannot explain peer punishment, Commentary
to F. Guala, Reciprocity: Weak or Strong? What Punishment
Experiments Do (and Do Not) Demonstrate,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2012, 35, 01, 21-22.
·
On negative time preferences (with Davide Dragone), E
conomics Letters,
2011, 111, 1, 37-39.
·
Cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future, (with
G. Camera)
American Economic
Review
,
2009, 99, 3, 979–1005.
·
The strategy method lowers measured trustworthy behavior, (with T.
Cason),
Economics Letters
,
2009, 103, 3, 157–159.
·
Group cooperation under alternative peer punishment technologies:
an experiment, (with L. Luini)
Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization,
2009, 71, 2, 273-282.
·
Pre-commitment and flexibility in a time decision
experiment,
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
2009, 38, 2, 117-141.
·
Markets in equilibrium with firms out of equilibrium: a simulation
study,
Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization
,
2008, 62, 2, 261 – 276.
·
Selection bias, demographic effects and ability effects in common
value auctions experiments, (with
J.Ham and J.Kagel)
American Economic Review
, 2007, 97, 4, 1278-1304.
·
Emergence of Endogenous Legal Institutions: Property Rights and
Community Governance in the
Italian Alps,
Journal of Economic History
, 2007, 67, 1, 191-226.
·
On the design of peer punishment experiments,
Experimental Economics
, 2005, 8, 2, 107-115.
·
Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments
with a centuries-old
institution, (with C.R. Plott)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
,
2003, 51, 2, 217-247.
