12525 - Economics of Public Institutions

Academic Year 2018/2019

Learning outcomes

This module introduces the main strands of the New Institutional Economics. The general goal of the analysis is to provide students with the basic tools of the economic approach to the study of the functioning, origins and impact of formal and informal institutions. By the end of the course, the students will be able to critically evaluate the observed institutional variation and propose possible reforms.

Course contents

Inclusive Political Institutions and the Economy: Stylized Facts

  • North et al. (2009), chapters 1-4.
  • Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2018. "Democracy Does Cause Growth." Forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy.
  • Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales. 2016. "Long-term Persistence." Journal of the European Economic Association, 14: 1401-1436.
  • Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson. 2004. "Unbundling Institutions." Journal of Political Economy, 113: 949-995.

 

Micro-Mechanisms: Political Order and Cooperation

  • North et al. (2009), chapters 5-6.
  • Fleck, Robert K., and F. Andrew Hanssen. 2006. "The Origins of Democracy: a Model with Application to Ancient Greece." Journal of Law and Economics, 49: 115-146.
  • Boranbay, Serra, and Carmine Guerriero. 2017. https://sites.google.com/site/carmineguerrieroshomepage/home/research-1 "Endogenous (In)Formal Institutions." Unpublished.
  • Guerriero, Carmine. 2018a. "Endogenous Institutions and Economic Outcomes." https://sites.google.com/site/carmineguerrieroshomepage/home/research-1

Micro-Mechanisms: Political Order and Property Rights

  • Coase, Ronald H. 1960. "The Problem of Social Cost." Journal of Law and Economics, 3: 1-44.
  • Besley, Timothy, and Maitreesh Ghatak. 2010. "Property Rights and Economic Development." In Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. V. Mark Rosenzweig and Dani Rodrik, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 4525-4589.
  • Calabresi, Guido, and Melamed, A. Douglas. 1972. "Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral." Harvard Law Review, 85: 1089-1128
  • Guerriero, Carmine. 2018b. "Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and the Limits of the Market." https://sites.google.com/site/carmineguerrieroshomepage/home/research-1

Micro-Mechanisms: Political Order and Regulation

  • La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins." Journal of Economic Literature, 46: 285-332.
  • Guerriero, Carmine. 2016a. "Endogenous Legal Traditions."International Review of Law and Economics, 46: 49-69.
  • Guerriero, Carmine. 2016b. "Endogenous Legal Traditions and Economic Outcomes." Journal of Comparative Economics, 44: 416-433.

Readings/Bibliography

  • North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Various papers (see course contents).

Teaching methods

Taught classes.

Assessment methods

Final written exam.

Teaching tools

Slides available from https://sites.google.com/site/carmineguerrieroshomepage/home/teaching/-home-teaching-Ec_Istituzioni

Links to further information

https://sites.google.com/site/carmineguerrieroshomepage/home/teaching/-home-teaching-Ec_Istituzioni/regole

Office hours

See the website of Carmine Guerriero